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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 was enacted
after much debate, a presidential veto, and congressional override. According
to the Act's legislative history, many in Congress perceived that a group
of "professional plaintiffs" and their regular counsel had come to dominate
securities class actions with disastrous results. Frivolous "strike suits"
were seen as burdening American business while meritorious actions were
often compromised on terms that benefited lawyers but left defrauded investors
without adequate compensation for their losses. The goal of the PSLRA was
to eliminate abuses without eviscerating investor protections. Key among
the PSLRA's reforms was a mechanism designed to encourage institutional
investors - and in this context Congress specifically identified public
pension funds - to take the lead role in monitoring and prosecuting securities
class actions.
CalPERS has a policy for monitoring securities litigation and determining
when CalPERS should pursue a lead plaintiff role. CalPERS also considers
other options in addition to pursuing the lead plaintiff role. For example,
CalPERS may "opt out" of a class action and pursue its own case if CalPERS
believes a better recovery can be achieved individually than through the
class. In other circumstances, CalPERS may closely monitor the class action
and seek to informally or formally influence the outcome of the litigation
by conferring with lead plaintiff or filing formal objections or arguments
in the case.
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